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Abstract
In this paper we study the role of ﬁnancial systems for the cost
channel transmission of monetary policy in a calibrated business cycle
model. We analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects that monetary policy has on
the economy, in particular on output and inﬂation, which are due
to diﬀerences in country-speciﬁc ﬁnancial systems. For a plausible
calibration of the model, diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems have a rather
limited eﬀect on the transmission mechanism and do not appear to give
rise to cross country diﬀerences in the strength of the cost channel.
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11 Introduction
According to the cost channel transmission of monetary policy, ﬁrms have to
borrow working capital to ﬁnance production (see Gaiotti and Secchi, 2006;
Barth and Ramey, 2000). As a consequence, the nominal interest rate enters
the cost function of the ﬁrm and inﬂuences production plans, price-setting
behavior, and ultimately, output and the inﬂation rate on an aggregate level.
Thus, in addition to the traditional aggregate demand channel monetary
policy exerts an eﬀect on the economy via the cost-side. Although a monetary
contraction, for instance, lowers the inﬂation rate through a reduction in
aggregate demand, borrowing costs increase due to higher interest rates.
Since ﬁrms take the increase in borrowing costs into account when setting
prices, a counteracting eﬀect on the inﬂation rate is introduced. It follows
that the price response is dampened by the presence of a cost channel and the
real eﬀects of monetary policy are ampliﬁed. Moreover, Ravenna and Walsh
(2005) argue that the presence of a cost channel has important consequences
for optimal monetary policy. They argue that if a cost channel exists, any
shock to the economy generates a trade-oﬀ for the monetary authority. Thus,
the scope for macroeconomic stabilization policy appears to be relatively
limited in the presence of sizeable cost channel eﬀects.
In this paper we analyze the role of ﬁnancial system aspects for the cost
2channel transmission of monetary policy shocks. In particular, the purpose
of the paper is twofold: First, we investigate to what extent the strength of
the cost channel may be related to characteristics of the ﬁnancial system and
second, we explore whether the heterogeneity of ﬁnancial systems observed
across countries (see Allen and Gale, 2000) should be expected to result
in cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀects that monetary policy has on the
economy via the cost channel. Chowdhury et al. (2005) present empirical
evidence in favor of cross country diﬀerences in the transmission mechanism
along these lines.
Our analysis will be based on a simple New Keynesian business cycle
model that is characterized by two elements. In our setup, the cost of work-
ing capital represents an additional channel for the transmission of monetary
policy, due to the assumption that labor has to be paid prior to production.
This feature of the model relates the paper to the literature on the cost chan-
nel transmission of monetary policy. Diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems will be
captured by varying the share of ﬁrms which depend on banks to obtain
ﬁnance for working capital and by varying the degree of the pass-through
from policy to retail interest rates, i.e. the degree of interest rate smooth-
ing. A bank-based system, which is characteristic for the euro area, will be
calibrated by a higher share of bank-dependent ﬁrms and a higher degree
of interest rate smoothing than a market-based system (which is thought
3to characterize the US). Berger and Udell (1992) argue that banks with
close ties to their customers may oﬀer implicit interest rate insurance. That
is, banks charge relatively low rates during periods of a monetary tighten-
ing, or periods of high market rates more generally, and vice versa (see also
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). As pointed out in Allen and Gale (2000),
liquidity smoothing is typical for bank-based ﬁnancial systems, in which close
customer relationships develop over time. Empirically, implicit interest rate
insurance gives rise to relatively smooth retail interest rates. De Bondt (2005)
ﬁnds that retail interest rates in the euro area are indeed sticky in the short
run. Although the pass-through from policy to retail interest rates is nearly
complete in the long run, it is only about one half in the short run.
Cross-country, and hence ﬁnancial system, comparisons in the magnitude
of responses in variables like nominal interest rates, prices and real activity to
monetary policy shocks are, in general, inconclusive. Most empirical studies
based on vector autoregressions ﬁnd that the qualitative responses of output
and prices are similar across countries, but these results have to be interpreted
with caution, as generally, the conﬁdence bands around the mean response
estimates are large.1 More recently, Dedola and Lippi (2005) ﬁnd evidence of
1Among others, Christiano et al. (1999), Cushman and Zha (1997), Fung and Ka-
sumovich (1998), and Grilli and Roubini (1996) apply the identiﬁed VAR approach to a
range of countries. More recently, Mojon and Peersman (2003) present evidence for the
countries in the euro area and Peersman and Smets (2003) use data for the euro area
economy as a whole.
4signiﬁcant cross-industry diﬀerences in the eﬀects of monetary policy, which
is partly related to the cost of working capital. However, they also ﬁnd that
cross-country heterogeneity is hardly detectable in the data.
Our results are in line with this empirical evidence. Generally, our results
indicate that for a plausible calibration of the ﬁnancial system, cost channel
eﬀects should be a relatively small element of the transmission mechanism.
The aggregate demand channel turns out to be substantially more relevant.
Thus, our analysis suggests that the cost channel and its implications for
optimal monetary policy discussed in Ravenna and Walsh (2005) should be
rather modest. In addition, we ﬁnd in contrast to Chowdhury et al. (2005)
that the cost channel plays only a limited role for explaining diﬀerences
across countries in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to output and
prices. Diﬀerences in the characteristics between the ﬁnancial system of the
euro area and the US do not appear to be large enough to result in sizeable
diﬀerences in the strength of the cost channel.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes
the setup of the model. Empirical estimates of the interest rate pass-through
are provided in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the model
and presents the results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
52 Model
2.1 Households






where β is a discount factor, Ct is consumption of a composite good in period












The composite consumption good, Ct, is a CES aggregate of the quantities











1− , where Pt(i)
denotes the price of good i.
Households enter each period with nominal assets, At−1 and decide on
consumption and savings, either in the form of deposits at a ﬁnancial inter-
mediary, Dt, or bonds issued by ﬁrms, Bt. Deposits yield a gross interest rate
of RD
t = 1+rD
t and the bond yield is denoted by RB
t = 1+rB
t . Furthermore,
households supply Lt units of labor at a nominal wage of Wt. As in Wood-
ford (2003) we abstract from explicitly modeling money. That is, we assume
that monetary frictions can be ignored and that the economy is ‘cashless’.
Moreover, it is assumed that transactions in the ﬁnancial markets have to
6be completed before the households can enter the goods market. Hence, the
households face the following constraint:
PtCt ≤ At−1 − Dt − Bt + WtLt. (3)
The representative household owns the ﬁrms and the ﬁnancial intermediaries
and receives dividends. Hence, the household’s nominal assets, At, evolve
according to:
At = At−1 + WtLt + r
D
t Dt + r
B
t Bt − PtCt + Πt, (4)
where Πt are dividends distributed at the end of the period. The household
maximizes lifetime utility subject to (3), (4) and the usual transversality
condition. The log-linearized necessary conditions associated with this max-
imization problem are:





t − Et(ˆ πt+1)) + Et( ˆ Ct+1), (5)
ˆ Wt − ˆ Pt = ηˆ Lt + σ ˆ Ct, (6)
ˆ R
D
t = ˆ R
B
t , (7)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from the steady state
and πt = logPt − logPt−1 is the inﬂation rate. Equation (5) is a standard
Euler equation, (6) is the labor supply equation and (7) is an arbitrage rela-
tionship between the returns on deposits and bonds.
72.2 Firms
The business sector of the economy consists of a continuum of monopolisti-
cally competitive ﬁrms normalized to have unit mass. Each ﬁrm i ∈ (0,1)
produces a diﬀerentiated consumption good. Furthermore, the ﬁrms are of
two types, depending on whether their output is subject to idiosyncratic
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1 with probability q
0 with probability 1 − q
for i ∈ (0,λ) and χi = 1 for i ∈ (λ,1). Hence, ﬁrms in the interval (0,λ)
can only repay their debt with probability q. In case of default, ﬁrms can
walk away from their debt obligations. While i is publicly observable, the
realizations of χi are not for i ∈ (0,λ), only the ﬁnancial intermediaries have
access to a monitoring technology that allows veriﬁcation of realizations of χi.
Due to the assumption that labor is paid in advance of production, ﬁrms have
to borrow working capital in order to ﬁnance the wage bill. In principle, each
ﬁrm has two sources of credit. They can either issue nominal bonds which
are sold directly to the households and are redeemed at the end of the period,
8or they can enter into debt contracts with a ﬁnancial intermediary. However,
since the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks are not public knowledge,
ﬁrms in the interval (0,λ) have an incentive to misreport their output and
to default on bonds owned by households. Consequently, these ﬁrms will not
be able to issue bonds in the ﬁrst place and will be forced to borrow from the
ﬁnancial intermediaries instead. Let RL
t denote the interest rate charged on
bank loans. Due to the ﬁnancial frictions in the model, the pricing decision
depends on whether the ﬁrm can directly issue bonds or has to borrow from
























holds for the bond-issuing ﬁrms, that is i ∈ (λ,1), where mcF
t and mcB
t
denote the marginal cost faced by the bank-dependent and bond-issuing
ﬁrms, respectively. Furthermore, staggered price setting is introduced. As
in Calvo (1983), each period, a fraction (1 − θ) of the ﬁrms is able to ad-
just its price. Moreover, we follow Gal´ ı et al. (1999) and Gal´ ı et al. (2001)
and allow inﬂation to depend on its own history by introducing ﬁrms that
follow a backward looking pricing rule. Only a fraction (1 − ω) of both,
bank-dependent and bond-issuing, ﬁrms which can set prices in the current
9period, resets prices optimally. The remaining ﬁrms follow the backward
looking rule: ˆ P b
t = ˆ P ∗
t−1+πt−1, where ˆ P ∗
t−1 denotes the average price (as per-
centage deviation from the steady state) set by ﬁrms that are able to adjust
their price in period t − 1. The aggregate price level evolves according to
ˆ Pt = θ ˆ Pt−1 + (1 − θ) ˆ P ∗
t . Let ˆ P F
t denote the price set by a ﬁrm that borrows
from ﬁnancial intermediaries and let ˆ P B
t denote the price set by a bond is-
suing ﬁrm. Thus, ˆ P ∗
t = (1 − ω)(λ ˆ P F
t + (1 − λ) ˆ P B
t ) + ω ˆ P b
t . The assumptions
on the price setting behavior of ﬁrms can be combined to obtain
ˆ πt = δd mct + βθφ









t denote the percentage deviation of average real marginal
cost from its steady state value.2
2.3 Financial Intermediaries
At the beginning of the period, ﬁnancial intermediaries receive deposits from
the households. Part of the total amount of loanable funds, Dt, is used to
provide loans, Lt, to ﬁrms which cannot borrow from households directly and
the rest is kept as reserves. In contrast to households, ﬁnancial intermediaries
can observe the realization of idiosyncratic shocks and are therefore able to
enforce debt contracts. At the end of the period, the ﬁnancial intermediaries
2For a detailed derivation see for instance Gal´ ı et al. (2001).
10receive payments from their solvent borrowers and return deposits with in-
terest to the households. The remaining proﬁts are paid to the households
as dividends.
There is a clear role for ﬁnancial intermediaries in this environment since
without the intermediaries, bank-dependent ﬁrms would have no opportunity
to borrow working capital and would be cut oﬀ from production. Further-
more, the ﬁnancial intermediaries can eliminate idiosyncratic default risk by
lending to an inﬁnite number of borrowers (Diamond, 1984).
We assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries can create loans by using deposits
as input: Lt = ΨtDt, where Ψt ∈ (0,1) determines the amount of loans that
can be generated from a given amount of deposits. This setup of the banking
sector is similar to Christiano et al. (2004), with the diﬀerence that in their
model excess reserves enter into the production function for loans. Note that
it is assumed that Ψt is strictly less than unity so that banks have to hold
reserves, which can be motivated as a reduced form way of modeling the risk
of unexpected withdrawals.
Moreover, we assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries smooth out liquidity
shocks that might otherwise give rise to large swings in lending rates. We
model this interest rate smoothing motive by assuming that the amount of
loans that is generated from a given amount of deposits is a function of the









where ψ0 > 0 and ψ > 0. The parameter ν indexes the importance of interest
smoothing. For ν = 0 the amount of loans that ﬁnancial intermediaries
can generate depends only on the current lending rate. According to this
speciﬁcation, ﬁnancial intermediaries are able to increase lending in times of
rising interest rates even if the amount of deposits does not increase. The
ﬁnancial intermediaries maximize proﬁts, given by qRL
t Lt − RD
t Dt, by the





































Note that this speciﬁcation appears to be broadly consistent with some em-
pirical regularities on retail interest rates. The pass-through is less than
perfect in the short run and lending rates display some persistence.
2.4 Monetary Authority
The policy instrument is the deposit rate since this interest rate is most




t = ρ ˆ R
D
t−1 + (1 − ρ)(κπˆ πt + κyˆ yt) + ut, (14)
where ρ determines the degree of monetary policy inertia and κπ, κy charac-
terize the response of the policy rate to inﬂation and output. ut is a serially
uncorrelated monetary policy shock with an expected value of zero.
2.5 Equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium for the model economy is characterized
by stochastic sequences of allocations and prices such that: (i) The house-
hold’s optimality conditions are satisﬁed. (ii) The necessary conditions that
determine optimal borrowing for bank-dependent ﬁrms as well as for bond-
issuing ﬁrms hold. (iii) The markets for labor, goods, loans and bonds clear.
The equilibrium dynamics of the log linear approximation of the model
around the steady state are determined by:





t − Et(ˆ πt+1)) + Et(ˆ Yt+1), (15)
ˆ πt = δ(λ ˆ R
L
t + (1 − λ) ˆ R
B
t ) + δγ ˆ Yt + βθφ






















t = ρ ˆ R
D
t−1 + (1 − ρ)(κπˆ πt + κyˆ yt) + ut, (19)
where γ =
1+η
1−α − 1 + σ.
133 Empirical Estimates of Pass-Trough and Per-
sistence
In this section we present empirical evidence on interest rate pass-through
and the persistence of lending rates for the euro area countries and the US.








where τ0 = 1
1+ψ and τ1 =
ψν
1+ψ. Given the estimates for τ0 and τ1 we may
recover the structural parameters ψ and ν to calibrate the model. We esti-
mate (20) for the US and the euro area countries except Austria, Greece and
Luxembourg which are excluded due to data limitations. We use quarterly
data on money market rates, three month Treasury Bill rates and prime rates
from the International Financial Statistics from 1990:1 to 2005:1.3 Depend-
ing on the availability of data, we use as a proxy for the policy rate either
the three month Treasury Bill rate (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France and
Italy) or the money market rate (Finland, Ireland, Netherland, Portugal and
the US).
Table 1 reports the results. For the euro area countries the estimates
for the pass-through coeﬃcient fall between 0.23 for Portugal and 0.75 for
Belgium. Interestingly, within a panel framework (see footnote 4), the test for
3The samples diﬀer somewhat for the individual countries.
14equal pass-through coeﬃcient in Finland, France, Germany and Portugal is
not rejected and estimated to be 0.25.4 Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Spain
form the other group of countries with a higher pass-through coeﬃcient of
0.66. Ireland falls in-between these two groups. Although a detailed analysis
of the diﬀerences in the pass-through processes is beyond the scope of this
paper, we ﬁnd that the heterogeneity between the two groups of countries
can be related to diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structure. The countries displaying
a lower pass-through, except for Portugal, are countries with a lower share
of short-term (less than one year to maturity) bank loans to ﬁrms in terms
of GDP and also in terms of year-end banks’ total assets (see table 2). This
share on average amounts to 24 percent and to 39 percent for the countries
with the lower and the higher pass-through, respectively. Portugal represents
the exception in the sample with the lowest instantaneous pass-through. It
is the country with the highest share of bank loans to ﬁrms in terms of GDP,
58 percent, while in most other euro area countries the share is far less than
50 percent. Nevertheless, for all euro area countries the null hypothesis of
perfect pass-through in the short run, H0 : τ0 = 1, can be rejected.
The persistence coeﬃcients range from 0.11 (Belgium) to 0.51 (Finland).
The estimates for τ1 are statistically diﬀerent from zero at least at the 10
4It is well known that including a lagged dependent variable in a panel regression
may lead to a downward bias in small samples. Although our sample appears to be
suﬃciently large, we have re-estimated the equation using the Arellano and Bond (1991)
GMM estimator. The results turn out to be almost identical.
15percent level for each euro area country.
Results for the US are shown in the last column of Table 1. For the US,
we ﬁnd that the pass-through is basically complete even in the short run.
The point estimate τ0 is 0.92 and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity at the
10 percent level. Moreover, the US lending rate does not appear to display
persistence, since the estimate for τ1 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In addition, the null hypothesis of equal estimates for τ0 and τ1 for the euro
area and the US is rejected at a high level of signiﬁcance. Thus, it appears
that the interest rate pass-through process diﬀers substantially between both
regions.
For three euro area countries (Italy, Netherlands and Spain) and the US,
the null hypothesis H0 : τ0 + τ1 = 1 cannot be rejected at the usual levels
of statistical signiﬁcance. Thus, for these countries, the lending rate appears
to be well described as a weighted average of the current money market rate
and the lagged lending rate, which implies that pass-through is complete in
the long run.
Our results are in line with the recent literature. Angeloni and Ehrmann
(2003) estimate the pass-through from policy rates to retail interest rates.
For the period 1999 - 2002 they report that on impact, the pass-through
from policy to retail interest rates is around 0.4 for the euro area and 0.7
for the US. De Bondt (2002) estimates a short-run pass-through to retail
16interest rates of 0.5 in the euro area. Our estimations for the US report
an almost complete pass-through from policy to lending rates in the short
run. For the euro area countries, we ﬁnd that the short run pass-through is
incomplete and substantially lower than in the US. Besides being in line with
the results reported in the literature, this ﬁnding is consistent with the idea
that European banks, in contrast to US banks, typically absorb liquidity
shocks to some extent and smooth out retail interest rates (see Ehrmann
et al. (2003)). Moreover, our results indicate that corporate lending rates in
the euro area display a high degree of persistence in contrast to the US.
4 Calibration and Simulation Results
The model is calibrated to analyze the question whether cost channel ef-
fects are diﬀerent between bank-based and market-based ﬁnancial systems.
Therefore, all parameters not related to ﬁnancial system characteristics are
calibrated to match features of the euro area in all simulations. The time
discount factor β is set to 0.99. The coeﬃcients in the utility function, σ
and η, are both set equal to 2, which is standard in the literature. The
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated goods, , is set to 11. For α
we choose 0.33. Furthermore, ω = 0.3, which means that 30 percent of the
ﬁrms follow a backward looking pricing rule. Prices are assumed to be ﬁxed
on average for 4 quarters, therefore θ = 0.75. This calibration of the price
17setting behavior is roughly in line with recent empirical evidence.5
The interest rate rule parameters are chosen according to the estimates
presented in Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) for the euro area. We set κπ = 2,
κy = 0.5 and ρ = 0.8.
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match ﬁnancial structure
characteristics of the euro area and the US, since these two economies are
generally thought to be examples of bank-based and market-based ﬁnancial
systems respectively. Cecchetti (2001) reports that bank loans account for
approximately 20 percent of all forms of ﬁnance in the US and for 50 percent
in the euro area.6 Hence, λ is set to 0.2 for the US and 0.5 for the euro area.
Recall that ψ and ν determine the pass-through from the deposit rate to the
lending rate and the degree of persistence in the lending rate, respectively.
These parameters are calibrated to Table 1. For the euro area ﬁnancial
system we set 1/(1+ψ) and νψ/(1+ψ) to 0.45 and 0.32 respectively, which
correspond to the average values (taken over EA low and EA low) obtained
for τ0 and τ1. For the US ﬁnancial system we set 1/(1 + ψ) = 0.92 and
νψ/(1 + ψ) = 0.05.
Figures 1 and 2 show the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
in the euro area and the US. The monetary policy shock gives rise to an
5See for instance Leith and Malley (2005).
6The number for the euro area is calculated as a population weighted average.
18increase in the deposit rate of one percentage point in both economies. In
the euro area, the lending rate reacts by less than in the US, albeit the
response of the lending rate is more persistent in the euro area, in line with
the characteristics of a bank-based ﬁnancial system. The increase in interest
rates leads to a decline in output and inﬂation.
Intuitively, a positive innovation to the interest rate rule induces house-
holds to postpone consumption and thereby decreases demand. The decline
in aggregate demand will be reﬂected in lower inﬂation since ﬁrms adjust
prices to the lower marginal cost associated with the lower quantity produced
in equilibrium. However, allowing marginal costs to be directly inﬂuenced by
the interest rate, due to the assumption that ﬁrms have to borrow working
capital, partly counteracts this eﬀect. Put diﬀerently, the higher borrow-
ing costs induce an adverse supply shock which partly oﬀsets the decline in
inﬂation and, on the other hand, ampliﬁes the negative eﬀect on output.
The question remains, whether diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems lead to
quantitatively non-negligible diﬀerences in the transmission mechanism. Ta-
ble 3 compares the impact responses of output and inﬂation for the euro
area and the US ﬁnancial system calibration and for the case where the cost
channel is inactive. Overall, the impact responses diﬀer only modestly for
the three diﬀerent calibrations. From the lower panel of the table we can see
that relative to the inactive cost channel calibration, the negative inﬂation
19response is somewhat muted in the euro area as well as in the US ﬁnan-
cial system. On impact, it is damped by approximately eight percent in the
US and by seven percent in the euro area. The impact response of output
is basically the same for all three calibrations considered. Thus, although
the dynamics of the inﬂation rate are to some extent inﬂuenced by the cost
channel, its quantitative inﬂuence on the overall transmission mechanism is
rather limited. This is especially true for the response of output to monetary
policy shock which appears to be entirely dominated by the aggregate de-
mand channel. Thus, we may conclude that diﬀerences in ﬁnancial systems
are not sizeable enough to lead to quantitatively signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
transmission mechanism in our framework.
Figure 3 compares the impulse responses of the inﬂation rate in more
detail. It appears that the diﬀerent ﬁnancial system calibrations yield only
small diﬀerences in the response of inﬂation. Even the calibrated higher
persistence in lending rates in Europe does not lead to a longer lasting prop-
agation of shocks. Thus, the cost channel per se does not appear to be an
important source of diﬀerences in inﬂation persistence across countries.
How do these ﬁndings compare with the existing literature? Note that
the Phillips curve (11) can be rewritten as













t−1 + δγ ˆ Yt
20+βθφ
−1Etˆ πt+1 + ωφ
−1ˆ πt−1. (21)
Thus, the interest rate enters the Phillips curve contemporaneously with
a coeﬃcient that is determined by the ﬁnancial system, λ
1+ψ + (1 − λ).7
When calibrated to US data this coeﬃcient is 0.98. For the euro area, the
calibration implies a slightly smaller coeﬃcient of 0.74. According to our
simulation results this diﬀerence is not large enough to have a large eﬀect
on the transmission mechanism. Ravenna and Walsh (2005) and Chowdhury
et al. (2005) provide estimates of this coeﬃcient for the US. Ravenna and
Walsh (2005) use a purely forward looking speciﬁcation and estimate a value
of 1.276. They cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient is equal to
unity. Chowdhury et al. (2005) report a coeﬃcient estimate of around 1.3.8
In addition, their coeﬃcient estimates for the European countries in their
sample tend to be lower than the corresponding estimate for the US. Thus,
the parameter values used in our simulation exercise appear to be roughly in
line with empirical evidence on cost channel eﬀects in New Keynesian Phillips
Curve models.
7Multiplied by δ, a parameter that is determined by the calibration of price setting
behavior.
8Using CPI inﬂation rate as dependent variable they ﬁnd a lower value of 0.8.
215 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the quantitative implications of ﬁnancial system charac-
teristics for the cost channel transmission of monetary policy. We ﬁnd that
for a reasonable calibration of ﬁnancial systems, the cost channel plays only
a limited role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to output and
prices. Although inﬂation dynamics are somewhat inﬂuenced by the pres-
ence of a cost channel, the model suggests that the output response is almost
completely dominated by the aggregate demand channel. In addition, ﬁnan-
cial systems do not appear to be heterogenous enough to result in sizeable
diﬀerences in the transmission mechanism across countries. Comparing the
euro area and the US ﬁnancial system, our results suggest that cost channel
eﬀects should be of similar orders of magnitudes in both cases. Our ﬁndings
are also consistent with Dedola and Lippi (2005) who ﬁnd no evidence in
favor of cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀects of monetary policy, despite
signiﬁcant cross-industry diﬀerences.
Our results also have implications for the monetary policy of the European
Central Bank. Since we ﬁnd that diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial systems that
characterize the euro area and the US give rise to only modest diﬀerences in
the transmission mechanism, one may conclude that the comparatively small
degree of heterogeneity in ﬁnancial systems across the euro area member
22countries should not be a source of asymmetric cost channel eﬀects.
The scope of this paper is also limited to the analysis of cost channel
eﬀects and therefore abstracts from the broad credit channel. Chowdhury
et al. (2005) argue that agency problems might give rise to indirect cost
channel eﬀects. Thus, incorporating potential indirect eﬀects of interest rates
on the price setting behavior of ﬁrms appears to be an interesting avenue for
future research. In addition, we have introduced interest rate pass-through
into the model in a highly stylized and reduced form way. Providing explicit
micro-foundations as well as empirical evidence for the behavior of banks
in diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems may lead to interesting further insights for the
transmission of monetary policy through the banking sector of an economy.
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29Table 3: Impact responses of Output and Inﬂation to a monetary Policy
shock
Inactive Cost Channel US Euro Area
ˆ Yt -1.65 -1.66 -1.66
ˆ πt -0.41 -0.37 -0.38
Relative to the Inactive Cost Channel Calibration
ˆ Yt - 1.00 1.00
ˆ πt - 0.92 0.93
Notes: Responses of ˆ Yt and ˆ πt to a monetary contraction. In the upper panel of the table,
the responses are measured in percentage deviations from the steady state. The lower
panel reports the responses relative to the calibration where the cost channel is inactive.
In all three experiments, all parameters not related to the ﬁnancial system are calibrated
to match characteristics of the euro area.
30Figure 1: Impulse Responses generated by the model calibrated to match
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